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FOOD AND DRUG LAW-STANDARDS OF CORPORATE LIABILITY
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975)
In United States v. Park, t the United States
Supreme Court reviewed the standard of liability of
corporate officers under the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act of 1938.2 The Supreme Court held that
1421 U.S. 658 (1975).
'Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§
301-392 (1970). The legislative history of this Act and its
predecessor, the Food & Drugs Act of June 30, 1906, ch.
3915, 34 Stat. 768, indicates that it was an attempt by
Congress to safeguard the health and safety of the individ-
ual citizen from the dangers of impure or mislabeled food,
drugs and cosmetics which had travelled in interstate
commerce. Since there are no federal police powers which
permit the regulation by Congress of the health and safety
of citizens within states it was necessary for Congress to use
its commerce powers to enact this legislation with the result
that the alleged adulterated or misbranded item must first
travel in interstate commerce before the Act applies. The
1938 version of the Act is an attempt to tighten up on the
"abuses of consumer welfare growing out of the inadequa-
cies in the Food & Drugs Act of June 30, 1906." H.R.
REP. No. 2139, 75th Cong, 3d Sess. 1 (1938).
The Act states in pertinent part:
§ 331. Prohibited acts.
The following acts and the causing thereof are
prohibited:
(k) The alteration, mutilation, destruction, oblit-
eration, or removal of the whole or any part of the la-
beling of, or the doing of any other act with re-
spect to, a food, drug, device, or cosmetic if such act is
done while such article is held for sale (whether or
not the first sale) after shipment in interstate com-
merce and results in such article being adulterated or
misbranded.
§ 333. Penalties.
(a) Violation of section 331 of this title.
Any person who violates a provision of section 331
of this title shall be imprisoned for not more than one
year or fined not more than $1,000, or both.
(b) Second offenses; intent to defraud or mislead.
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)
of this section, if any person commits such a violation
after a conviction of him under this section has be-
come final, or commits such a violation with the in-
tent to defraud or mislead, such person shall be im-
prisoned for not more than three years or fined not
more than $10,000, or both.
§ 342. Adulterated food.
A food shall be deemed to be adulterated-
(a) Poisonous, insanitary, etc., ingredients.
... (3) if it consists in whole or in part of any
filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance, or if it is
otherwise unfit for food; or (4) if it has been prepared,
packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby
the Act, as interpreted in United States v. Dotter-
weich,3 imposes upon persons exercising the author-
ity and responsibility relevant to their positions in
the corporations "not only a positive duty to seek out
and remedy violations when they occur but also, and
primarily, a duty to implement measures that will
insure that violations will not occur."'
Respondent Park was the president of Acme
Markets, Inc., a national retail food chain. Both
respondent and Acme were charged in an informa-
tion with violating section 331(k) of the Act.' The.
information alleged that they had caused food that
had moved in interstate commerce and that was to be
offered for retail sale to be stored in insanitary
conditions at Acme's Baltimore warehouse. Acme
pleaded guilty to the charge, but the respondent
pleaded not guilty. At the trial an FDA consumer
safety officer testified that on two occasions, in late
1971 and early 1972, inspections of Acme's Bal-
timore warehouse revealed evidence of rodent infesta-
tion and other insanitary conditions. Testimony was
also given by the Chief of Compliance of the FDA's
Baltimore office that after the first inspection re-
spondent was informed by letter of the conditions at
the Baltimore warehouse.
In his defense respondent testified that, while all of
Acme's employees were under his general directions,
the organizational structure of the company provided
that different phases of its operation were delegated
to individuals and their subordinate staff. Park also
testified that upon receipt of the FDA letter he
conferred with the vice president for legal affairs who
informed the respondent that the Baltimore divi-
sional vice president was investigating the matter and
it may have been rendered injurious to health.
320 U.S. 277, 281, 284 (1943). Dotterweich involved
the prosecution of Buffalo Pharmacal Company, Inc., and
Dotterweich, its president and general manager, for violat-
ing provisions of the Act in that they had caused the
shipment of misbranded drugs and adulterated drugs in
interstate commerce. The case held that corporate agent,
Dotterweich, could be held criminally liable, absent the
element of "awareness of some wrongdoing," if it were
shown that he had a "responsible share in the furtherance
of the transaction which the statute outlaws, namely, to put
into the stream of interstate commerce adulterated or
misbranded drugs." Id. (emphasis added).
4421 U.S. at 672.
5See note 2 supra.
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would take corrective action and reply to the FDA
letter. Respondent testified that he did not believe
there was anything more he could have done. On
cross-examination Park conceded that providing for
sanitation conditions for food offered for sale to the
public was a function that he was "responsible for in
the entire operation of the company."' However,
respondent further stated that this was one of the
phases of operation he had assigned to "dependable
subordinates."
Over respondent's objection evidence was admit-
ted concerning a letter Park had received in April
1970 from the FDA in regard to insanitary condi-
tions at Acme's Philadelphia warehouse. Respondent
testified that the same individuals were responsible
for sanitary conditions at the Philadelphia and
Baltimore warehouses. He conceded that it appeared
that the company's procedure for handling sanitation
"wasn't working perfectly" " and that as president he
was responsible for "any result which occurs in our
company."
During Park's trial in district court the trial judge
ruled that Dotterweich was the controlling case. The
instructions 8 he issued to the jury reflect the Dotter-
weich standard of liability, i.e., "the offense is
6421 U.S. at 664.
71d. at 664-65.
8The trial judge instructed the jury:
"In order to find the Defendant guilty on any count of the
Information you must find beyond a reasonable doubt on
each count ....
"Thirdly, that John R. Park held a position of
authority in the operation of the business of Acme
Markets, Incorporated.
"However, you need not concern yourselves with
the first two elements of the case. The main issue for
your determination is only with the third element,
whether the Defendant held a position of authority
and responsibility in the business of Acme Markets.
"The statute makes individuals, as well as corpo-
rations, liable for violations. An individual is liable if
it is clear, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the ele-
ments of the adulteration of the food as to travel in
interstate commerce are present. As I have instructed
you in this case, they are, and that the individual had
a responsible relation to the situation, even though he
may not have participated personally.
"The individual is or could be liable under the
statute, even if he did not consciously do wrong.
However, the fact that the Defendant is preslidjent is
a chief executive officer of the Acme Markets does
not require a finding of guilt. Though, he need not
have personally participated in the situation, he must
have had a responsible relationship to the issue. The
issue is, in this case, whether the Defendent, John R.
Park, by virtue of his position in the company, had a
position of authority and responsibility in the situa-
tion out of which these charges arose."
committed . . . by all who do have such a responsible
share in the furtherance of the transaction which the
statute outlaws." 9 Based upon the evidence presented
during trial and the instructions issued by the trial
judge, thejury in Park found the respondent guilty of
violating section 331(k) of the Act. On appeal the
Fourth Circuit reversed,10 reasoning that the trial
judge had failed to include in his jury charge an
instruction as to the element of "wrongful action," "
with the result that the jury may have erroneously
believed that Park could be found guilty without
proof of any wrongful act on his part. The Supreme
Court reversed the appellate court's decision and
reinstated Park's conviction. 12
The Court held that the trial court's instructions
sufficiently focused the jury's attention on the issue of
respondent's accountability with respect to the condi-
tions that gave rise to the charges against him, and
did not permit the jury to convict merely on the fact
that respondent was president of the offending
corporation. In addition, the Court decided that the
trial court had not erred in admitting testimony given
by respondent concerning a prior FDA warning he
had received. It deemed such evidence relevant as
rebuttal to the "respondent's defense that he had
justifiably relied upon subordinates to handle sani-
tation matters." 13 The prior FDA warning was ad-
missible to show that, prior to the Baltimore inspec-
tion, the respondent had knowledge that he could
not depend on his system of delegation for handling
sanitation matters.
An examination of prior cases reveals that Park
did not occur as an isolated expression of statutory
interpretation in the area of food and drug laws.
Id. at 665 n.9, quoting the appendix to the brief on appeal,
which listed the trial judge's instructions.
9320 U.S. at 284.
10499 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 658
(1975).
11499 F.2d at 841-42. The appellate court argued that
the Government had misinterpreted Dotterweich. It
claimed that the Dotterweich decision had dispensed with
the element of "awareness of some wrongdoing" but had
not dispensed with the necessity to prove "wrongful action"
on the part of the defendant. However, the appellate court
did not give an altogether clear definition of "wrongful
action."
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 331 (k)
prohibits "causing" the adulteration of food which
has traveled in interstate commerce and is held for
sale. We would define "wrongful action" in this con-
text as acts of the accused which caused the adultera-
tion of such food.
id. at 841 n.4.
12421 U.S. at 678.
13Id.
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Instead, the foundation for the Park decision was laid
as early as the beginning of this century. In United
States v. Balint, 14 for instance, the Supreme Court
recognized a trend away from the common law rule
that scienter was a necessary element for conviction
of a crime. This trend had begun to emerge in the
area of statutory measures concerned with the
health and well-being of the individual such as the
Act on which Park is founded. Justice Taft, speak-
ing for the Court in Balint, stated:
While the general rule at common law was that the
scienter was a necessary element in the indictment
and proof of every crime, and this was followed in re-
gard to statutory crimes even where the statutory def-
inition did not in terms include it ... there has been
a modification of this view in respect to prosecutions
under statutes the purpose of which would be ob-
structed by such a requirement. It is a question of
legislative intent to be construed by the court.
"4258 U.S. 250 (1922).
'
5 ld. at 251-52.
"
6
.See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
252-56 (1952); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 CoLuI.
L. REV. 55 (1933). In Morissette the Court characterized
this class of regulatory measures, stating:
Many of these offenses are not in the nature of posi-
tive aggressions or invasions, with which the com-
mon law so often dealt, but are in the nature of ne-
g!ect where the law requires care, or inaction where
the law imposes a duty. Many violations of such reg-
ulations result in no direct or immediate injury to
person or probability of it which the law seeks to
minimize. While such offenses do not threaten the
security of the state in the manner of treason, they
may be regarded as offenses against its authority, for
their occurrence impairs the efficiency of controls
deemed essential to the social order as presently
constituted. In this respect, whatever the intent of
the violator, the injury is the same, and the conse-
quences are injurious or not according to fortuity.
Hence, legislation applicable to such offenses, as a
matter of policy, does not specify intent as a necessary
element. The accused, if he does not will the viola-
tion, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more
care than society might reasonably exact from one
who assumed his responsibilities.
Morissette v. United States, supra at 255-56.
In Sayre's article there is a detailed account of the his-
tory, trend and merits of these types of regulatory measures,
which he classifies as "public welfare offenses." Sayre,
supra at 56. The traditional element of mens rea is absent
from such regulations in order that the public policy
behind each is not defeated. The argument is that if the
government were required to prove a guilty mind in each
instance, the offense would often go unprosecuted because of
the difficulty of establishing intent in many of these cases.
The criminal sanctions imposed by these measures serves, it
is believed, as an effective regulatory device facilitating
compliance with the statute. Since penalties were relatively
slight the harm done to an innocent offender was felt to be
small when compared to the social good achieved as a result
of such regulations. It is interesting to note that where the
In this regard the courts began to recognize that
certain statutory measures did not require proof of
such guilty intent. These measures were generally
regulatory measures whose purposes were aimed
more at the achievement of the health and safety of
the community rather than at the punishment of the
crime. The impetus for such measures resulted from
the emergence of the modern industrial state where
individuals were often helpless to protect themselves
against the mass production and sale of foods and
beverages and other consumer goods. 6
One early, case which typifies this new attitude and
construction of regulatory statutes by the courts is
United States v. Mafield. 17 The defendants in this
case were corporate officers and stockholders of a
beverage company charged with violating the Food
and Drugs Act of 190618 by introducing misbranded
beverages into interstate commerce. The defendants
were not directly involved in this transaction, nor did
they directly manage the company's business affairs.
The facts show that defendants had hired a managing
agent and that it was this agent who operated the
plant and managed its business affairs. The report of
the case consists entirely of the district judge's jury
charge. The charge noted that the mere fact the
defendants were officers and stockholders in the
corporation did not make them responsible under the
Act. As the court stated:
[Tlheir responsibility depends altogether upon
whether or not they conferred on the manager the au-
thority to ship Celery Cola from one state into an-
other; and whether the shipment upon which this
prosecution is based was made by the manager pursu-
ant to the authority so conferred. 19
If the jury were to find that the defendants had
conferred such authority on the manager, then the
defendants would be criminally liable regardless of
their lack of knowledge or intent to violate the
statutory provisions of which they were charged. 2" In
Park, the Supreme Court, with Chief Justice Burger
writing for the majority, 2 considered Mayfield an
early reflection of
penalty involves a heavy fine or imprisonment, Sayre argues
that in order to safeguard against individual interests being
jeoparized the element of mens rea should be maintained
and the burden of proving lack of criminal intent should be
shifted to the defendant. Sayre, supra at 79.
'177 F. 765 (N.D. Ala. 1910).
'
5 Act ofJune 30,1906, ch. 3915, § 12, 34 Stat. 768.
19177 F. at 767.
"
5Since the report of Mayfield consisted entirely of the
district courtjudge'sjury charge, no indication is given as to
the final disposition of the case by the jury.
" Chief justice Burger was joined by Justices Douglas,
Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist.
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the view both that knowledge or intent were not re-
quired to be proved in prosecutions under its [Federal
Food and Drugs Act of 19061 criminal provisions, and
that responsible corporate agents could be subjected to
the liability thereby imposed. 2
Federal cases during this early period frequently
held that the 1906 Act did not require proof of
knowledge or intent on the part of the defendant.
2
1
Such cases represent a general trend toward stricter
liability in the area of food and drug regulations in
that they dispense with the scienter requirement.
With the exception of Mayfield, federal cases recog-
nizing the principle that a corporate officer may be
criminally liable under such statutes by virtue of his
"managerial position" are rare. Even the majority's
opinion in Park fails to cite an early federal case on
this point. It instead looks to various state court
decisions for support.4
After the enactment of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act of 1938 the Supreme Court made its
22421 U.S. at 670.
"
3See, e.g., United States v. Sprague, 208 F. 419
(E.D.N.Y. 1913); People v. Schwartz, 28 Cal. App. 2d
775, 70 P.2d 1017 (1937). In Sprague the defendants were
copartners in a company and were charged with shipping in
interstate commerce adulterated oysters. In construing the
1906 Act the district judge stated:
Congress has seen fit to impose a penalty for such a
violation, and it is no defense to claim that the person
causing the violation neither knew at the time that the
goods were offensive, nor intended to violate the law
.... But Congress has gone much further, and in the
exercise of its police power has imposed a penalty
upon the sending of the deleterious or harmful sub-
stance, where the shipper is responsible for the act
of sending, even though he may have nothing to do
with the condition of the article sent, except as pos-
session or ownership make him responsible.
United States v. Sprague, supra at 423.
2 E.g., State v. Burnam, 71 Wash. 199, 128 P. 218
(1912). In Burnam the defendant was the secretary-treas-
urer and manager of a dairy corporation. His duties
included the management of the active business of the
corporation, the employment and discharging of men, and
the buying and general supervision of the mixing of the
milk. He was convicted of having in his possession, with
intent to sell and deliver, milk of a grade below the standard
fixed by law. The facts showed that a chemical analysis of a
sampling of milk taken from a wagon belonging to the
corporation revealed that the milk had been watered and
was below standard. The defendant argued in his defense
that "he was not present when that particular wagon left
the dairy and that his instructions were to keep the milk up
to the standard fixed by law." Id. at 200, 128 P. at 219.
The Supreme Court of Washington cited the rule to be that
where a managing agent of a corporation exercises control
and assists in the regulation of the business, the agent may
be held liable "in the violation of a police regulation when
neither a guilty knowledge nor criminal intent is made an
element of the offense." Id. at 202, 128 P. at 219.
first major effort to deal with the corporate officer's
liability under the Act in United States v.
Dotterweich. 2 In that-case the Court dealt with the
question of whether "any person" in section 303(a)
included corporate agents. The circuit court 2" had
previously reversed Dotterweich's conviction by
holding that the words "any person" referred only to
the corporation. The Supreme Court in Dotterweich
reversed, reasoning that the only way a corporation
can act is through its agents. It noted that although
the Food and Drugs Act of 1906 specifically included
officers and agents of a corporation within its
provisions, 2 7 the deletion of these words in the 1938
Act was only "in the interest of brevity and good
draftsmanship," 8 since "by 1938, legal understand-
ing and practice had rendered such statement of the
obvious superfluous." 2 9 The purpose of the 1938 Act
was, it said, "to enlarge and stiffen the penal net and
not to narrow and loosen it."" 0
In reviewing Dotterweich Chief Justice Burger
noted that in order to prevent the holding in that case
from operating too harshly, since it dispensed with
the need to prove an "awareness of some wrongdo-
ing," the Dotterweich Court provided a limiting
principle which dictates that the offense is only
committed by those "who have . . . a responsible
share in the furtherance of the transaction which the
statute outlaws."'3 Furthermore, the Court in Dot-
terweich regarded as "too treacherous"2 32 any at-
tempt to define or to provide examples of persons
standing in such a "responsible relation." It there-
fore left the question of responsibility to be decided
by the jury, under proper guidance, based on the
evidence produced at trial. Cases occurring over the
three decades since the Dotierweich decision, some of
which the Court cites in Park, 2 indicate a general
25320 U.S. 277 (1943). See note 3 supra.
2 6United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d 500
(2d Cir. 1942), rev'd, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).27Food & Drugs Act ofJune 30,1906, ch. 3915, § 12, 34
Stat. 768 provided that:
IT]he act, omission, or failure of any officer, agent, or
other person acting for or employed by any corpora-
tion, company, society, or association, within the scope
of his employment or office, shall in every case be also
deemed to be the act, omission, or failure of such
corporation, company, society, or association as well as
that of the person.
This section was not included in the Federal Food, Drug &
Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1970).
18320 U.S. at 282,29 1d.
30Id.
" 421 U.S. at 669 quoting the majority in Dotterweich,
320 U.S. at 284.
32320 U.S. at 285.23 United States v. Shapiro, 491 F.2d 335 (6th Cir.
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adherence to the principles of corporate liability
under the Act as announced in that early case.
In the recent case of United States v. Cassaro,
Inc. "' the First Circuit sustained the conviction of the
defendant who, along with the bakery he worked for,
was charged with storing flour that had moved in
interstate commerce, under insanitary conditions re-
sulting in its adulteration within the meaning of
sections 342(a) (3), (4). " Defendant's defense was
that he could not be found guilty because he was sick
and not present at the bakery at the time of the FDA
inspection, and that his brother was in charge during
this period. The circuit court noted, according to
1974); United States v. 3963 Bottles, More or Less, 265
F.2d 332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 931 (1959);
Lelles v. United States, 241 F.2d 21 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 974 (1957); United States v. Kaadt, 171 F.2d 600
(7th Cir. 1948). In 3963 Bottles, More or Less the court
notes that while the Act is an example of a "public welfare
statute," dispensing with the element of wrongful intent,
"criminal liability is not . . . imposed automatically under
this type of law upon every officer or agent no matter how
remote his connection with the offending corporation." The
court goes on to say that the "proper test" was "clearly
enunciated" in Dotterweich. "Criminal responsibility...
attaches to those who have a responsible share in further-
ance of the transaction which the statute outlaws." The
question of "responsibility" is to be left with the jury under
proper guidance assuming the evidence warrants it. United
States v. 3963 Bottles, More or Less, supra at 336.
In Lelles both the corporation and its president, Lelles,
had been charged and found guilty of violating 21 U.S.C. §§
331, 333 (1970). The corporation was acquitted on an
order entered by the trial judge. Evidence had been
produced at trial showing that the shipments in violation of
the Act were made by a different corporation, but one in
which appellant was also president. On appeal appellant
argued that he could only be liable as an officer of the
corporation and since the corporation was acquitted,
appellant could not be liable. In sustaining the decision of
the trial court the appellate court relied on Dotterweich to
the effect "that a person who has responsibility in the
business activities of a corporation may be personally
guilty." Lelles v. United States, supra at 23.
In Kaadt appellants appealed from a jury conviction for
violation of the Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act. The
violation concerned the introduction, and delivery for
introduction into interstate commerce of certain misbranded
drugs. In reviewing the trial court's instruction the appel-
late court noted that "physical participation" was not
essential to establish criminal liability under the Act. The
issue to be determined by the jury was whether the
defendants had shared in the responsibility of conducting
the operations of that business, and that "the duties and
responsibilities of each, and the extent to which each
controlled or directed the conduct of the business," were
relevant to that determination. United States v. Kaadt,
supra at 604.
14443 F.2d 153 (lst Cir. 1971).
3 21 U.S.C. § 342 (1970). See note 2 supra.
Dotterweich:
The offense is committed... by all who... [have] a
responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction
which the statute outlaws.3 6
Based upon the fact that the defendant had the
overall responsibility for the management of the
bakery and that the defendant had testified that "he,
Salvatore, had full responsibility for operations,""
the court sustained his conviction. Since the Dotter-
weich decision in 1943, the extent to which the
Supreme Court has seen fit to extend its principles is
probably most strikingly illustrated by its decision in
United States v. Wiesenfeld WVarehouse Co., 38where
it was held that a mere bailee may be criminally
liable under the Act. In this case a public storage
warehouseman was charged with violating section
301(k) of the Act. 9 The district court dismissed the
charge for failure to state an offense under the Act. It
reasoned that section 301(k) did not apply to the
mere act of "holding" goods. On direct appeal" by
the Government the appellee argued that as a bailee,
rather than a seller, he was not holding the food
within the meaning of section 301(k). The Supreme
Court disagreed with appellee's construction and
stated:
The language of § 301(k) does not limit its application
to one holding title to the goods, and since the danger
to the public from insanitary storage of food is the
same regardless of the proprietary status of the person
storing it, the purpose of the legislation-to safeguard
the consumer from the time the food is introduced into
the channels of interstate commerce to the point that
it is delivered to the ultimate consumer-would be
substantially thwarted by such an unwarranted read-
ing of the statutory language. "
Accordingly the Court held that the information did
charge an offense under section 301(k) of the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
36443 F.2d at 157, quoting the majority in Dotterweich,
320 U.S. at 284,
17443 F.2d at 157.
"i376 U.S. 86 (1964).
3921 U.S.C. § 331(k) (1970). See note 2 supra.
"
5The Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731
(1969), provides in part:
An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the
United States from the district courts direct to the
Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal
cases in the following instances:
From a decision or judgment setting aside, or dis-
missing any indictment or information, or any count
thereof, where such decision or judgment is based
upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon
which the indictment or information is founded.
4i376 U.S. at 92.
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The principal question confronting the Court in
Park, left unanswered by Dotterweich and its prog-
eny, was whether the element of "wrongful action" is
a requisite for convicting a corporate agent. The trial
judge in Park had instructed the jury that an
individual could be criminally liable under the Act
"even if he did not consciously do wrong.""
Therefore, the issue to be decided by the jury was
whether, as a result of defendant's position with the
corporation, he "had a position of authority and
responsibility in the situation out of which these
charges arose."43 The court of appeals objected to
these instructions because they might have led the
jury to incorrectly believe "that Park could be found
guilty in the absence of 'wrongful action' on his
part."44
The majority in the Supreme Court disagreed with
the position taken by the Fourth Circuit concerning
the necessity of the Government's establishing
"wrongful action." Instead the Court focused on
what it believed to be the corporate agent's duty in
these situations. As the majority defined it, that duty
is "imposed by the interaction of the corporate
agent's authority and the statute .... . ""The
degree of "authority" is that which would enable the
individual "either to prevent in the first instance, or
promptly to correct, the violation complained of
.... -46 In reviewing the jury instructions, the
majority expressed a desire to avoid taking state-
ments from the charge and judging them in "artifi-
cial isolation, '"'7 as it felt the court of appeals had
done. It sought instead to consider the instructions in
the context of the entire trial. The Fourth Circuit, on
the other hand, had treated the matter narrowly in
concluding the trial judge's instructions were im-
proper. It had therefore reversed and remanded the
trial court decision because it felt the lower court's
instructions had allowed the jury to convict the
defendant solely on the basis of his position as
president of the corporation. The Court majority,
however, held that, when viewed as a whole, and in
context, the instructions adequately focused the
jury's attention on the main issue of respondent's
accountability with regard to the conditions forming
the basis of the charge against him. The majority
concluded that the instructions
fairly advised the jury that to find guilt it must find the
42See note 8 supra.
431d.
44499 F.2d at 841-42.
'421 U.S. at 674.461d.
471d. at 674, quoting the majority in Cupp v. Naughten,
414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973).
respondent "had a responsible relation to the situa-
tion," [food held in insanitary conditions in a ware-
housel and "by virtue of his position.., had author-
ity and responsibility" to deal with the situation. 48
The Supreme Court also disagreed with the court
of appeals in regard to the admission of testimony
concerning a prior FDA letter warning respondent of
insanitary conditions at Acme's Philadelphia ware-
house. The higher court recognized that although, in
the words of Dotterweich, "the ultimate judgment
of juries must be trusted,"4'juries may require more
than "corporate bylaws" in determining one's guilt.
Acting upon this realization, the majority reviewed
the testimony given by respondent to the effect that in
such a large operation as Acme he had no choice but
to rely on subordinates whom he considered to be
"dependable" and in whom he had "great confi-
dence." Such testimony, the majority felt, created a
definite need for rebuttal evidence. The "relevance
and persuasiveness" 5 0 of the testimony concerning a
prior FDA warning, "outweighed any prejudicial
effect." 5 The majority concluded that the sole
purpose of the testimony was to show that prior to
the alleged violations respondent was aware that his
system of controlling sanitary conditions at Acme's
warehouses, for which he was ultimately responsible,
was deficient. The trial court's admission of such
evidence was therefore deemed an essential and
proper part of the prosecutor's case.
On the basis of these points then, the Court
reversed the court of appeals and upheld the jury
verdict. This decision, however, was not unanimous
on all points. In writing the dissenting opinion,
Justice Stewart" disagreed with neither the major-
ity's view of Dotterweich that "any person" speci-
fied in 21 U.S.C. § 333 included any corporate of-
ficer or employee "standing in responsible relation"
to those conditions forbidden by the Act, nor the
conclusion that the traditional element of "aware-
ness of some wrongdoing" was not a requirement
for criminal liability under the Act. However, he did
depart from the majority's view as to the sufficiency
48421 U.S. at 674.
"Id. at 669-70 quoting the majority in Dotterweich,
320 U.S. at 285.
50421 U.S. at 678. In support of this point the majority
depends on the analogy to the rule whereby the prosecution
is forbidden to introduce evidence of the bad character of the
defendant until the defendant has himself given evidence of
his good character. Cf., e.g., United States v. Ross, 321
F.2d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 1963); 2 J. WIG.tORE, EVIDENCE §
302 (3d ed. 1940).
11421 U.S. at 678.5 Justice Stewart was joined by Justices Marshall and
Powell.
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of the jury charge. Justice Stewart stated that as they
were expressed, the instructions "were a virtual
nullity, a mere authorization to convict if the jury
thought it appropriate." 53 He insisted that, while a
finding of guilt under the Act did not turn on the de-
fendant's "awareness of some wrongdoing," it did
require that the jury be instructed that the Govern-
ment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
respondent "enagaged in wrongful conduct amount-
ing at least to common-law negligence." 4
The dissent thus agreed with the court of appeals
that an instruction as to "wrongful action" must be
contained in the jury charge. The dissent objected to
the trial judge's instruction which predicated guilt
upon a finding of "responsibility" and which cau-
tioned the jury that "the fact the Defendant is present
[sic] and is a chief executive officer of the Acme
Markets does not require a finding of guilt.""5 It
was felt that such instructions left the jury with no
proper guidance as to the definition of "responsibil-
ity," and in effect allowed them to acquit or convict
on the basis of "its rough notions of social justice.""
For this reason, the three dissenters refused to af-
firm Park's criminal conviction.
The majority in Park concedes to the minority that
the concept of a "responsible share" in the violation
of the Act indicates some degree of "blameworthi-
ness." However, it correctly reasons that this
"blameworthiness" is not the equivalent of the
"wrongful action" thought to be required by the
court of appeals, but is instead the "failure . .. to
fulfill the duty imposed by the interaction of the
corporate agent's authority and the statute . . . ." 5 It
thus becomes the task of the jury to determine from
the evidence whether the individual has such a duty,
and if so, whether his failure to exercise that duty
constitutes a "responsible share" in the violation of
the Act. In regard to the principal issue, the majority
concludes that the judge's instructions did not allow
the jury to convict solely on the basis of respondent's
position in the corporation. The trial judge had
instructed the jury that "the fact that the Defendant
is pres[idlent and is a chief executive officer of Acme
Markets does not require a finding of guilt." 5 8 By his
instructions he adequately focused the jury's atten-
tion on the issue of respondent's authority with re-
spect to the charges against him. In rendering its
53421 U.S. at 682 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
541d. at 683 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"1d. at 679 (Stewart, J., dissenting), quoting from the
trial judge's instructions. See note 8 supra.
5 Id. at 682 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 674.
"SSee note 8 supra.
decision about the propriety of the instructions, the
Supreme Court majority viewed them in the context
of the entire trial and deemed them quite appro-
priate. "
The Court also gave its approval to the prosecu-
tion's summary to thejury which pointed out respon-
dent's testimony that he was responsible for the sys-
tem set up to monitor sanitation, and respondent's
knowledge prior to the 1971 and 1972 inspections
that his system did not work. The majority justi-
fiably concludes that the jury had to be aware that
their inquiry and determination should focus on the
respondent's accountability with respect to the
charges against him, and not on his position in the
corporation. Finally, the majority's determination
that the jury charge was a correct statement of the
law enabled it to conclude that any request for
amplification must rest in the discretion of the trial
judge. '0 In this instance then, the denial of respon-
dent's request for amplification was not an abuse of
discretion.
Generally, United States v. Park represents a clear
affirmation by the Court of a stricter standard of
responsibility on the part of corporate officers and
agents. While the decision in Dotterweich was
suggestive of a stricter standard for those who had a
"responsible relation" to the situation, it neverthe-
less left unanswered the question of who had such a
responsible relation. The Park decision, on the
other hand, makes clear by its facts that any
corporate officer or agent who has the responsibility
and authority to deal with matters within the
coverage of the statute, must make an affirmative
effort to seek out and remedy possible violations.
Moreover, he must insure that effective measures are
59Support for the Supreme Court majority's view on this
point can be found in United States v. Birnbaum 373 F.2d
250 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967). The court
in Birnbaum recognized the rule that:
In evaluating the instruction to the jury, not only ist
must each statement made by the judge be examined ht
in light of the entire charge, but the charge itself can be
only be viewed as part of the total trial. Often isolated ts
statements taken from the charge, seemingly pre- ir
judicial on their face, are not so when considered in ie
the context of the entire record of the trial.
373 F.2d at 257.
6 Support for the Supreme Court majority's conclusion
on this point can be found in United States v. Bayer, 331
U.S. 532 (1947). On this point of amplification of the jury
charge by the trial judge the Court in Bayer states the
practice that is followed:
Once the judge has made an accurate and correct
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implemented so that violations will not occur. Any-
thing less invites prosecution.
Specifically, the decision accomplishes two things:
(1) clarification of Dotterweich, and (2) pronounce-
ment of the respective roles of court and jury in
determining respondent's responsibility. On the first
point, Park demonstrates that a corporate agent may
be held criminally liable under the Act for failing to
exercise the authority and responsibility imposed on
him by the corporation in relation to compliance
with the provisions of the Act. It is not necessary for
him to be the immediate cause of the criminal acts,
nor is it necessary that he have any direct contact or
participation in the acts. Thus proof of "wrongful
action" is not an element of the Act. Second, Park
emphasizes that the question of "responsibility" is to
be decided by the jury under the proper guidance of
the trial judge, and that adequate guidance in such
cases would be an instruction advising the jury that
"to find guilt it must find respondent 'had a
responsible relation to the situation,' and 'by virtue
of his position . . . had authority and responsibility'
to deal with the situation." "1
Park has clearly brought the corporate agent's
accountability under the Act closer to the standard of
strict liability. If, by this decision, the Court hopes
61421 U.S. at 674.
someday to place the accountability of corporate
agents within the strict liability standard, it will first
have to deal with the problem raised by the dissent-
ing opinion. This problem is that a strict liability
standard would allow a defendant to be convicted
solely on the basis of his position in the corporation
and therefore suffer a criminal penalty and possible
jail sentence. Since, however, the practical effect of
Park is very close to that of a strict liability standard
the Court will probably be content to leave the
matter as Park establishes it. It is unlikely, therefore,
that the Court will choose to encounter the problem
presented by the imposition of a strict liability
standard where criminal sanctions are involved.
However, within the context of the Park decision
there are more immediate ramifications. Because of
the strict standard of accountability imposed by Park,
there is the possibility that the more qualified
individual will hesitate before taking such a respon-
sible position within a corporation for fear of crimi-
nal prosecution. If so, then the incentives offered to
such individuals by companies may have to sub-
stantially increase to offset such fears. Moreover, in
applying the Park decision, courts will have to bal-
ance the need for competent individuals in corporate
positions against the imposition of responsibility on
corporate agents under the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act.
